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Abstract Reward cues have been found to increase the
investment of effort in tasks even when cues are presented
suboptimally (i.e. very briefly), making them hard to con-
sciously detect. Such effort responses to suboptimal reward
cues are assumed to rely mainly on the mesolimbic dopa-
mine system, including the ventral striatum. To provide
further support for this assumption, we performed two
studies investigating whether these effort responses vary
with individual differences in markers of striatal dopami-
nergic functioning. Study 1 investigated the relation between
physical effort responses and resting state eye-blink rate.
Study 2 examined cognitive effort responses in relation to
individually averaged error-related negativity. In both stud-
ies effort responses correlated with the markers only for
suboptimal, but not for optimal reward cues. These findings
provide further support for the idea that effort responses to
suboptimal reward cues are mainly linked to the mesolimbic
dopamine system, while responses to optimal reward cues
also depend on higher-level cortical functions.
Keywords Rewards  Motivation  Reward-sensitivity 
Subliminal priming  ERP
Introduction
People generally invest more effort in demanding tasks if the
anticipated rewards are more valuable (Brehm and Self 1989;
Gendolla et al. 2012). As such, cues that indicate that valu-
able rewards are at stake increase effort expenditure during a
wide variety of physical and cognitive tasks. These effort
responses are generally considered to result from a deliberate
decision making process, in which people weigh the pros and
cons of potential effortful actions. In other words, people are
thought to weigh the value of anticipated rewards (the ben-
efits) against their respective effort requirements (the costs).
Challenging this traditional perspective on human motiva-
tion, a recent series of studies has shown that reward cues can
instigate effortful behavior even when these cues are pre-
sented suboptimally (i.e. very briefly), which makes con-
scious processing less likely (see for reviews Bijleveld et al.
2012b; Custers and Aarts 2010). So, the expenditure of effort
may be initiated without deliberate decisions.
At this point, the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie
this intriguing phenomenon are still subject to debate. In the
present research, we explore the idea that effort responses to
suboptimal reward cues are dependent on dopaminergic
activity in the ventral striatum. Specifically, we use two
physiological correlates of such activity—resting state eye-
blink rate (EBR, Study 1) and error-related negativity (ERN,
Study 2)—to examine the relation between effort responses
and dopaminergic functioning. In doing so, we hope to further
our understanding of how reward cues influence effort
expenditure in the absence of deliberate decisions.
Effort responses to suboptimal reward cues
Pessiglione et al. (2007) first demonstrated that suboptimal
reward cues can affect the expenditure of effort even when
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people cannot consciously discriminate between high and
low reward cues. In their experiment, participants could
earn money by squeezing forcefully into a handgrip. At the
beginning of each trial of their experiment, a coin was
presented that represented the amount of money that was at
stake. This coin was either one British pound (high reward)
or one penny (low reward). The harder participants
squeezed the handgrip, the higher the proportion of the
presented reward they received. Remarkably, participants
not only squeezed harder on high versus low reward trials
when the coins were presented long enough to be clearly
visible, but also when they were presented too briefly to
allow conscious discrimination. For optimal reward cues,
functional MRI data showed significant brain activation for
high (vs. low) reward cues (see also Van Hell et al. 2010),
especially in the ventral striatum and ventral pallidum,
which are output channels of the striatal dopamine system
(Heimer and Van Hoesen 2006). However, although there
was a significant increase in the effort people invested in
the task for high versus low reward cues, no significant
differences in brain activation were found for suboptimal
reward cues. Hence, the neurobiological basis of the
behavioral consequences of suboptimal reward cues is still
unclear.
Using behavioral paradigms, though, a considerable
number of studies have found reliable effects of suboptimal
reward cues on effortful behavior (see for an overview
Capa and Custers 2013). Although the effects on task
performance are often similar to those generated by opti-
mal reward cues (e.g., Bijleveld et al. 2009), recently
researchers have started to study the circumstances under
which the effects of optimal and suboptimal reward cues
diverge. Bijleveld et al. (2010), for instance, looked at
speed-accuracy trade-offs in a math task in which the
percentage of the cued reward that was earned for correct
answers declined with time. Suboptimal high (vs. low)
reward cues were found to increase speed without affecting
accuracy. Optimal reward cues caused a slowdown, but an
increase in accuracy. Whereas optimal reward cues clearly
altered behavior through strategic processes (i.e. slowing
down and thus sacrificing a little bit of the reward in order
to be more accurate), suboptimal reward cues seemed to
only boost the effort people exerted on the trial. Such
dissociations have been found in various other studies (e.g.,
Zedelius et al. 2011, 2012), suggesting that optimal and
suboptimal reward cues affect the investment of effort
through processes that are (at least partly) distinct.
To account for these findings, Bijleveld et al. (2012b)
have proposed that responses to reward cues can be
understood by distinguishing two phases in the processing
of reward cues. Initially, rewards are valuated and pro-
cessed by rudimentary brain structures, which may occur
without conscious awareness. As a consequence of such
initial processing, effort is increased (but only if the task
demands it, Bijleveld et al. 2009), which in turn facilitates
performance. This initial reward processing is thought to
rely on the mesolimbic dopamine system, including the
ventral striatum, which supports effort responses to
rewards in animals that lack the cortical sophistication that
is characteristic of humans (e.g., Phillips et al. 2007). If a
reward cue is presented long enough, however, the reward
is thought to undergo full reward processing which enables
deliberate decision making. In this case, information car-
ried by the reward cue becomes available to higher-order
brain functions, presumably located in the cortex. Associ-
ated with conscious deliberation, these higher-order func-
tions enable strategic reward-related decision-making
processes and enable people to reflect on the reward that is
at stake. Such higher-order functions can affect perfor-
mance beyond the mere expense of effort. For example,
they change tradeoffs in speed versus accuracy (Bijleveld
et al. 2010), change the way attention is deployed to task
stimuli (Bijleveld et al. 2011), and induce people to dis-
engage from tasks altogether when the payoff is deemed
too small (Bijleveld et al. 2012a).
Based on the theoretical framework laid out above, it
can be hypothesized that activity in the ventral striatum is
especially predictive of performance when reward cues are
presented suboptimal and only processed initially (unless
there is less room for strategic behavior, e.g., Pessiglione
et al. 2007). After all, we suggest that initially processed
rewards directly boost the expenditure of effort in
demanding tasks, making use of only this subcortical
infrastructure (and not of strategic functions located in the
cortex). In the present paper, we test this idea. Specifically,
we investigate whether individual differences in striatal
dopaminergic functioning predict performance due to ini-
tially processed reward cues.
Striatal dopaminergic functioning
The ventral striatum has been identified as a key structure
in the processing of reward cues by studies showing that
activity in the striatum was correlated with the value of the
rewards at stake (Bjork and Hommer 2007; Knutson and
Greer 2008; Schultz et al. 1997). The striatum connects to
various other structures, such as the pallidum, that are
implicated in goal-directed behavior (Aston-Jones and
Cohen 2005; Knutson et al. 2008) and has been linked to
reward prediction during learning tasks (O’Doherty et al.
2004; Pessiglione et al. 2007). These findings are in line
with research on rodents, demonstrating that pallidal and
striatal neurons encode for rewarding properties of envi-
ronmental stimuli (Tindell et al. 2006).
Key to the activity in these reward centers of the brain is
the neurotransmitter dopamine (Bjo¨rklund and Lindvall
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1984). Stimuli signaling potential rewards as well as the
presence of rewards have been found to trigger dopamine
release in the striatum, which respectively increases effort
directed at reward attainment and learning of stimulus-
reward contingencies (Schultz 2006). Although the way in
which dopamine influences reward-directed effort is not
yet fully understood (Braver et al. 2014), it appears that
general levels of dopamine in the striatum have to be taken
into account to predict effects on motivation. That is, apart
from phasic shifts in dopamine, tonic dopamine levels
seem to affect the overall vigor with which rewards are
pursued. These levels are affected by recently encountered
rewards, general motivational states such as thirst and
hunger, but also individual differences in baseline dopa-
mine levels (Niv et al. 2007). In rats, striatal dopamine
depletion (i.e. low baseline level) has been found to be
associated with a lack of reward pursuit, especially when
pursuit is effortful (Phillips et al. 2007). Baseline striatal
dopamine levels, then, may be related to general dopami-
nergic functioning and moderate the effect of reward cues
on effort responses. Therefore, if effort responses to sub-
optimal reward cues are dependent on initial processing in
the striatum, these effort responses to these reward cues
are likely to be correlated with striatal dopaminergic
functioning.
To test this hypothesis, we present two studies in which
we investigate whether effort responses to reward cues are
related to two different markers of striatal dopamine
functioning: EBR and ERN. In Study 1, we investigated if
resting state EBR is related to physical effort responses in
reaction to suboptimal reward cues. In Study 2, we used
another marker of striatal dopamine functioning, individ-
ually averaged ERN, and investigated whether this measure
is related to mental effort.
Study 1
Resting state EBR is strongly linked to activity in the
striatal dopamine system (Karson 1983). Investigating
Parkinson patients that are characterized by low EBRs and
low levels of striatal dopamine, Karson showed that
patients receiving levodopa medication (a dopamine ago-
nist) exhibited twice the mean EBR of that of other Par-
kinson patients. Furthermore, the more symptomatic
patients of the non-levodopa group showed significantly
lower blink rates. Other clinical observations show ele-
vated EBR in patients with increased levels of dopamine in
the striatum, including symptomatic schizophrenic patients
(Howes and Kapur 2009; Kegeles et al. 2010).
Importantly, EBR has been found to be correlated with
personality traits such as impulsivity, novelty seeking, and
positive emotionality, which in turn are associated with
reward sensitivity (Dagher and Robbins 2009; Depue et al.
1994; Huang et al. 1994; Martin and Potts 2004). For
instance, impulsive individuals tend to prefer immediate
rewards, and choosing immediate rewards is associated
with greater activity in areas innervated by the mesolimbic
dopamine system, including the ventral striatum (Hariri
et al. 2006; McClure et al. 2004). If effort responses to
suboptimal reward cues indeed rely on striatal dopami-
nergic functioning, these responses should increase with
EBR.
To examine the effects of reward cues on physical
effort, we relied on a task that was used by Bijleveld et al.
(2012a). In line with the research of Pessiglione et al.
(2007), participants in this task are on each trial presented
with either a high or low value coin that is displayed either
for a brief or a long time interval. After the presentation of
the reward cue, participants have to repeatedly press a
button within a specific time limit in order to obtain the
reward. We expected to find a reward effect (i.e. partici-
pants expending more effort in the high reward, 10-cent
trials, than in the low reward, 1-cent trials) for both optimal
and suboptimal reward cues, but that the occurrence of this
effect would correlate positively with individual differ-
ences in EBR only for suboptimal cues.
Methods
Participants
Forty-one (33 female) healthy undergraduate and graduate
students (Mage = 21.24; SD = 1.61) participated in the
study for a financial reward. Several selection criteria were
applied (Colzato et al. 2009): All participants were healthy
volunteers, and reported no psychiatric or neurologic dis-
orders, nor brain trauma. Furthermore, participants
declared not to use drugs or psychoactive medication, and
did not smoke. In addition, per request participants did not
consume any beverages on the day of the study that con-
tained caffeine.
EBR measurement
EBR was recorded by using infrared videography tech-
nology (Tobii X120 Eye Tracker, 120 Hz sampling rate).
Participants were asked to sit in a chair, in upright position,
and look straight ahead for 5 min at a white fixation cross
(35 by 35 mm) on a black screen (60 Hz LCD monitor
with a resolution of 1,024 by 768, at a distance of 60 cm).
An infrared eye tracker underneath the screen registered
the participants’ eye blinks. After the actual thirty-second
calibration, participants were told calibration of the eye
tracker would continue for another 5 min, during which
blinks where measured. A blink was defined using the
Motiv Emot (2014) 38:759–770 761
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points of missing data from both eyes between 100 and
500 ms (Aarts et al. 2012). After the removal of three
outliers ([2 SD above the mean, with an unrealistically
high EBR above 55 blinks/min suggesting artifacts from
the equipment) and two participants suffering from hay
fever, mean EBR per minute in our sample was 18.92
(SD = 10.38).
Experimental task
To assess the reward priming effect we used a ‘finger-
tapping task’ in which effort expenditure was measured
(Bijleveld et al. 2012a; see also Treadway et al. 2009), and
this task was started directly after the EBR measurement.
On each trial, participants needed to execute a specific
amount of button presses (25) within a set time (3.5 s) in
order to obtain a monetary reward. Finishing the button
presses outside of the time limit was allowed, but simply
did not lead to obtaining the reward. Each button press
filled an empty circle in a bar on the screen, so that after
each button press the bar filled up providing feedback.
Participants received money when they successfully filled
the bar within the time limit. Each trial started with a fix-
ation cross displayed on the screen for 1,000 ms, followed
by a 300 ms pre-mask, either the high or low value stim-
ulus displayed long (300 ms) or brief (17 ms). The dura-
tion of the post mask was either 483 or 200 ms, to keep the
total duration of the stimulus presentation constant. After a
1,000 ms fixation cross the response screen was visible.
Trials ended with a feedback screen displaying whether the
participant was fast enough in order to obtain the reward.
This reward was equal to the value of the coin that was
presented at the beginning of the trial. To prevent partici-
pants from using two hands, each trial was started by
holding a key with the non-dominant hand while the
dominant hand remained free to execute the button presses.
The study used a 2 (reward value: 1 vs. 10 cents) 9 2
(reward presentation: suboptimal vs. optimal) within-sub-
jects design. Participants started with 16 practice trials in
order to get familiar with the task demands, and these were
identical to the actual task but participants did not receive
the money earned. The actual task thereafter consisted of
64 trials. Trials were presented in random order.
Reward cues
Following the exact same stimuli and procedure for reward
presentation as Bijleveld et al. (2012a), the picture of 10 a
Eurocent coin was taken as a high reward cue and the
picture of a 1 Eurocent coin as a low reward cue. The
pictures depicting the coin were 120 9 120 pixels in size
and were presented for a brief (17 ms) or long (300 ms)
time interval between masks. The suboptimal presentation
time in combination with the masking proved too fast to
allow conscious discrimination above change level in a
standard signal detection task in previous research
(Bijleveld et al. 2012a).
Results and discussion
Reward effect
The median tapping times (i.e. the time it took to press 25
times) were subjected to analysis of variance, with reward
value (low vs. high) and reward presentation (suboptimal
vs. optimal) as within-subjects variables. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect of reward value, F(1,
35) = 24.21, p \ .001, gp
2 = .41; reward presentation,
F(1, 35) = 10.19, p = .003, gp
2 = .23; and the interaction
effect, F(1, 35) = 21.25, p \ .001, gp
2 = .38. The reward
effect was stronger for optimal, t(36) = 4.78, p \ .001
(one-tailed; Mlow = 3,775, SD = 837; Mhigh = 3,102,
SD = 281) than for suboptimal cues, t(36) = 2.03, p = .02
(one-tailed; Mlow = 3,222, SD = 337; Mhigh = 3,198,
SD = 315), although for both presentation times, high
reward cues yielded significantly faster tapping than low
reward cues. This difference seems to be mainly driven by
participants refraining from investing effort on optimal low
reward trials (cf., Bijleveld et al. 2010).
Eye blink rate
A Pearson correlation was computed to test for a link
between EBR and the reward effect, which was calculated
by subtracting the tapping times of the high reward value
trials from those on the low reward value trials so that
higher values indicate a speed up for higher rewards. The
test revealed a positive correlation for suboptimal reward
cues, r(36) = .37, p = .02 (one-tailed), but not for optimal
reward cues r(36) = -.04, p = .81 (see Fig. 1). The dif-
ference between these two correlations proved significant,
with a Steiger’s Z score of 1.73, p = .02 (one-tailed;
Steiger 1980).
These results first of all show that participants indeed
exerted significantly more effort when presented with the
high value coin, regardless of whether this presentation was
optimal or suboptimal. Secondly, a significant correlation
between participants’ EBR and their reward effect on
performance was found for suboptimal, but not for optimal
reward cues. In conclusion, assuming EBR is a represen-
tative marker, the results of this first study are suggesting a
connection between striatal dopaminergic functioning and
people’s effort responses to reward cues, but only when
these are presented suboptimally.
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Fig. 1 Study 1: Scatterplots of the reward effect against baseline EBR in both the suboptimal condition (left) and the optimal condition (right),
for response times (performance on low reward trials subtracted from high reward trials)
Fig. 2 Study 2: Scatterplots of the reward effect against ERN size in both the suboptimal condition (left) and the optimal condition (right), for
accuracy and response times (performance on low reward trials subtracted from high reward trials). a Accuracy, b response times
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Study 2
To increase convergent validity, we opted for a different
marker of individual differences in striatal dopamine
activity in Study 2. An important potential drawback of
EBR is that it cannot be measured at the actual time of the
experimental task. To overcome this drawback, Study 2
used ERN instead of EBR, a neurophysiological measure
that can be measured simultaneously with task perfor-
mance. Moreover, we used a cognitive task instead of a
physical task, where response accuracy and speed served as
indicators of performance. In previous research, cognitive
tasks have successfully been used to discern between the
effects of optimal and suboptimal reward cues, both on the
behavioral and the brain level (e.g., Bijleveld et al. 2010;
Capa et al. 2012).
Electroencephalography was used to obtain event-rela-
ted potentials (ERP) during the task. In the last decade,
studies have identified a neural response to errors that has
been termed the ERN or error negativity. Observed at
fronto-central recording sites, ERN consists of a large
negative shift in the response, or feedback-locked ERP
occurring 50–100 ms after subjects have made an errone-
ous response (Holroyd and Coles 2002). Localization with
dipole localization algorithms has led most researchers to
conclude that ERN originates in the anterior cingulate
cortex, a structure directly connected to the ventral
striatum.
There are several indications that the amplitude of the
ERN can be interpreted as a correlate of functioning of the
dopamine system. For example, previous studies show that
administering drugs that increase striatal dopaminergic
activity, such as amphetamine or caffeine, also increase
ERN. Moreover, patients with schizophrenia, obsessive–
compulsive disorder and Parkinson’s disease, all charac-
terized by disturbances in dopaminergic activity, show
abnormal ERNs (Holroyd et al. 2002; Olvet and Hajcak
2008). Similarly, ERN is observed to decline together with
weakened dopaminergic activity accompanying old age
(Nieuwenhuis et al. 2010). This leads us to suggest that
taking average ERN over all incorrect trials reflects dopa-
minergic functioning in participants, and subsequently
yields a meaningful individual difference measurement.
Methods
Participants
Thirty participants were recruited (Mage = 21.53, SD =
2.40, 25 females), via flyers distributed at university
buildings. Subject screening was done through an online
questionnaire to ensure they met the same inclusion criteria
as in the previous study. One subject declared after the
study to have been diagnosed with ADHD, and was
therefore left out of the analysis. Another subject was left
out due to equipment failure, bringing the final amount to
twenty-eight (Mage = 21.64, SD = 2.45, 23 females).
Participants were compensated with the money they earned
during the study, which was on average €12.92.
The study used a 2 (reward value: 1 vs. 50 cents) 9 2
(reward presentation: brief vs. long) within-subjects design,
with EEG measurements to test for between-subjects
effects. After 20 practice trials, participants completed 160
trials in total, 40 repetitions per condition. Fifty-cent coins
were used instead of 10 cent, in an attempt to maximize
reward effects on effort as well as on ERN (see Bijleveld
et al. 2010, for use of the same coins and masks).
Procedure
Upon entering the lab participants signed informed consent
and received verbal instructions, after which the facial and
EEG electrodes were applied. Participants were seated in
front of a 60 Hz CRT monitor with a resolution of 1,024 by
768 at a viewing distance of 60 cm, which was measured at
the beginning of each study. Participants were told that on
each trial in the study they would see a coin (1 or 50 cents),
which they could earn by correctly solving the subsequent
task.
Experimental task
The task was analogous to the one used in the first study.
Again, each trial started with a fixation cross visible for
1,000 ms. Then, participants saw a coin, presented between
masks for 17 (suboptimal) or 300 ms (optimal), where the
combined presentation time of masks and stimuli was kept
constant. After the presentation of the coin, another fixation
cross appeared for a random duration between 1 and 3 s.
The subsequent task consisted of a field of squares and
triangles displayed in a 4 by 4 grid, and participants were to
assess whether there was an even or odd number of trian-
gles (actual numbers ranging from 3 to 8). After an answer
was provided using either of two keys on the keyboard, a
feedback screen appeared indicating whether their answer
was right or wrong. The amount of money they received for
each correct trial was contingent on their response latency:
the faster they were, the more money they earned. The
amount was computed as M = V - (V 9 (T/A)), where
M is the amount of money earned, V is the value of the coin
that was presented (in cents), T is the response latency, and
A is a participant-specific ability parameter that was com-
puted based on participants’ performance during the prac-
tice trials. This parameter was computed so that it would
roughly force an equal number of errors per participants. It
generated a response window within which the reward
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declined to zero that was so brief that participants had to
make an educated guess, rather than engage in actual
counting to still be able to earn a percentage of the reward.
Under this time pressure, we assumed to find reward effects
mainly on accuracy. With reaction times [0, the earned
amount was always less than the coins presented at the
beginning of the trial. When the response was incorrect, the
participant received no money. The specific amount earned
per trial with their overall cumulative earnings was shown
at the final screen of each trial. Then, a new trial started.
Coin visibility
In order to verify whether participants could accurately
discriminate between high- and low-value coins when
presented for 17 ms, a signal detection task was run after
the experimental task on the same participants. They were
exposed to the same coin stimuli as in the task (i.e. 1 vs.
50 cents, presented for 17 vs. 300 ms), and they were
subsequently asked to indicate the identity of the stimulus
using two keys representing the high and low value coin.
The task consisted of 120 trials, with 30 trials per
condition.
EEG recording
EEG was recorded from 32 scalp locations using to the
International 10–20 EEG System with Ag–AgCl-tipped
electrodes. Electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from
bipolar montages above and below the right eye and the
outer canthi of the eyes. Raw EEG recordings were made
with the ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands) relative to the common mode sense (CMS).
All data were recorded with a sampling rate of 2,048 Hz,
and data were stored for offline analysis.
ERPs
EEG data recorded during the task were re-referenced
offline to the averaged signal of all scalp channels, and
subsequently filtered with a 1 Hz high-pass filter and a
slope of 24 dB/oct, and a 10 Hz low-pass filter with a slope
of 24 dB/oct. Data were segmented into 2,500 ms windows
with a 100 ms baseline correction with respect to the
feedback stimulus onset. Ocular artifacts were corrected
using the Gratton and Coles algorithm (Gratton et al. 1983)
in addition to a visual inspection and segments containing
artifacts were removed (difference criterion between two
subsequent data points of 50 lV; differences criterion
within segment of 100 lV; absolute amplitude criterion of
50 lV). For each participant the segments containing trials
with an erroneous response were combined for the calcu-
lation of an average feedback-locked ERN. The average
was determined on the FZ electrode within a window of
0–300 ms after the feedback, where the lowest and sub-
sequent highest amplitudes were averaged over miss-trials
per participant. Taking the difference between these two
peaks acted as an additional baseline correction. These
amplitudes were later on subtracted, highest minus lowest,
to end up with an overall measurement of individual ERN.
Results and discussion
Coin visibility
To assess whether participants could consciously discrimi-
nate between high and low rewards for suboptimal cue trials,
forced-choice signal detection test data were analyzed using
a binomial test. This revealed an accuracy of 54.41 %
(SD = 10.49), slightly but significantly above chance with
z = 2.60, p \ .01. Accuracy was significantly lower, though,
than for optimally presented cues (Moptimal = 96.07 %,
SD = 18.52 %), t(28) = -10.87, p \ .001.
Counting task
The mean accuracy scores were subjected to an analysis of
variance, with reward value (low vs. high) and cue presen-
tation (suboptimal vs. optimal) as within-participants vari-
ables. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of
reward value, F(1, 27) = 13.89, p \ .001, gp
2 = .34, with
no effect for cue presentation, nor an interaction effect
(both F’s\ 1). The effect of reward value was significant
for suboptimal cues (Mhigh = 85.71 %, SD = 9.47 %;
Mlow = 81.43 %, SD = 7.31 %), t(28) = 2.52, p = .01
(one-tailed), but not for optimal cues (Mhigh = 85.89 %,
SD = 7.79 %; Mlow = 82.68 %, SD = 10.43 %), t(28) =
1.67, p = .06 (one-tailed). In addition, the mean response
times were also subjected to a similar analysis of variance.
This analysis revealed no significant main effect of reward
value, F \ 1; but did show an effect for Cue presentation,
F(1, 27) = 5.10, p = .03, gp
2 = .16. Although the interac-
tion was not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.85, p = .06,
gp
2 = .13, reward effects were explored for suboptimal and
optimal reward cues separately. Participants did not respond
faster on high reward compared to low reward trials
(Mhigh = 2,060 ms, SD = 385; Mlow = 2,044 ms, SD =
361) for suboptimal cues, t \ 1, but did so for optimal cue
trials (Mhigh = 2,002 ms, SD = 339; Mlow = 2,049 ms,
SD = 346), t(28) = 1.97, p = .03 (one-tailed).
With our signal detection scores slightly above chance,
we investigated the relation between coin visibility and the
reward effect on accuracy for brief presentations using the
method recommended by Greenwald et al. (1995). The
reward effect was regressed on the coin visibility variable,
which was recoded so zero represented chance level
Motiv Emot (2014) 38:759–770 765
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detection. It was found that the slope of the regression line
was not significant, b = .15, t(26) = 0.81, p = .43, indi-
cating no relation between conscious detection of the
reward cue and the reward effect. Then we tested whether
the intercept was significantly above zero, b = .04,
t(26) = 2.02, p = .03 (one-tailed), which it was. Hence,
the regression model suggests a reward effect even when
reward detection is at chance level. Together, this suggests
that increases in the reward effect for suboptimal reward
cues are not dependent on conscious awareness.
ERN
To test the degree to which the effects of optimal and
suboptimal reward cues were modulated by dopaminergic
functioning, we computed individually calculated ERN
size, by averaging ERN size over all incorrect trials. First a
Pearson correlation was computed between averaged ERN
and the reward effect on accuracy (accuracy for low reward
cues subtracted from that for high reward cues). As
expected, ERN size correlated positively with the reward
effect for suboptimal reward cues, r(28) = .40, p = .02
(one-tailed), but not with that for optimal reward cues,
r(28) = -.08, p = .68 (see Fig. 2). These two correlations
are significantly different from each other, with a Steiger’s
Z score of 1.80, p = .02 (one-tailed; Steiger 1980). ERN
size did not significantly correlate with the reward effect on
response times for suboptimal, neither for optimal reward
cues, p’s [ .05. To control for potential tradeoffs between
speed and accuracy, we partialed out the effects of reaction
times on accuracy (see Custers and Aarts 2003 for a similar
analysis). ERN size remained significantly correlated with
the reward effect for brief reward cues, r(25) = .39,
p = .02 (one-tailed).
Discussion
Looking at cognitive effort responses, we replicated our
earlier findings and demonstrated that participants per-
formed better when presented with a reward cue of higher
value. Although there was a main effect of reward value on
accuracy, there was no significant difference in this effect
for the different cue presentations. The analyses of the
reaction times suggest that this may be due to a shift in
emphasis on reaction times on trials with optimal reward
cues. Similar strategic shifts were observed by Bijleveld
et al. (2010), although in that particular paradigm partici-
pants slowed down their responses in order to increase
accuracy. The fact that we observe a speedup here with no
significant effect on accuracy for optimal trials is probably
due to the short time window in this task, which forces
participants to make an educated guess. Under these
circumstances, slowing down would probably not lead to a
reliable increase in accuracy.
Overall, higher accuracy was linked to increased striatal
dopaminergic functioning, as indicated by averaged ERN
amplitude, but only for suboptimal reward cue trials. In
addition, this effect was still present when controlling for
speed, which shows that the accuracy effect is a genuine
effect on performance and not caused by a speed accuracy
trade-off.
According to the signal detection task participants were
able to discriminate the briefly presented cues slightly
above chance level. However, there are several reasons to
assume that effort responses on the brief reward cue trials
do not reflect responses that are the result of deliberate
reward processing. First of all, there seemed to be a dif-
ference in the effects on reaction times for suboptimal and
optimal reward cues. Although the interaction was not
significant, participants were faster for high than low
optimal reward cues, which may reflect strategic behavior
as faster reaction times were rewarded. No such effect was
observed for brief reward cues. Second, in line with our
predictions, ERN only correlated with the reward effect for
brief reward cues, which suggest that for these cues, the
effect was not overruled or overshadowed by strategic
reactions or reflections on reward value. As such, we
strongly suspect that despite reward detection being
slightly above chance for brief reward cues, responses to
these cues could still be regarded as reflecting initial
reward processing.
One could argue that at first sight, measuring of ERN on
the same trials that serve as performance measure presents
a confound. That is, an increase in accuracy (less errors)
would cause ERNs to be calculated over fewer trials,
possibly increasing the resulting mean ERN as errors
would be rarer. However, if this would have caused the
effect, one would expect performance to be correlated to
ERN on trials with optimal reward cues as well, as they
would contribute equally to overall accuracy as suboptimal
reward cue trial would. Although investigating the relation
between ERN and accuracy in each cell of the design
would be informative in many respects, the low number of
error trials contributing to the ERN average prevented us
from running such analyses.
General discussion
The present research aimed to examine the role of the
mesolimbic dopamine system in producing rudimentary
effort responses. First of all, our studies replicate earlier
findings by demonstrating that effort responses can result
from reward cues that are presented suboptimally, which
makes the contribution of conscious, deliberative processes
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unlikely. Second, reward responses were found to be cor-
related with both resting-state EBR and averaged ERN
amplitude—both markers of striatal dopaminergic func-
tioning, but only for suboptimal reward cues. As such, the
current findings provide support for the involvement of the
mesolimbic dopamine system in effort responses to sub-
optimal reward cues.
The results presented here support the model of reward
pursuit put forward by Bijleveld et al. (2012b), in which
effort responses to optimal and suboptimal reward cues are
assumed to rely, at least partly, on different anatomical
structures in the brain. Whereas processing of suboptimal
reward cues is thought to require no awareness and to rely
on subcortical brain structures—most notably the stria-
tum—optimal reward cues enjoy full reward processing
associated with conscious awareness, which allows for a
host of strategic and reflective processes that are supported
by higher-level cortical areas. The observation that a cor-
relation between effort responses and striatal dopaminergic
functioning was obtained only for suboptimal reward cues
fits the notion that for optimal reward cues, initial effort
responses produced by rudimentary reward processing can
be overruled or overshadowed by these strategic processes.
The finding that individual differences in striatal dopa-
minergic activity were linked to effort responses solely for
suboptimal cues suggests that effects of optimal reward
cues rely more on the interaction between these sub-cor-
tical areas and higher cortical processes (Cools 2011).
In situations where the task constrains strategic responding,
or performance does not benefit from it, initial and full
reward processing may produce the same outcomes (see
e.g., Bijleveld et al. 2009; cf., Pessiglione et al. 2007). As
noted earlier, in previous work we found that people
deliberately sacrifice speed for accuracy for when a valu-
able reward was at stake, causing full reward processing to
diverge from the initial course (Bijleveld et al. 2010). Such
responses to fully processed reward cues may in this case
be very well correlated with individual differences that
affect strategic responding independently of striatal dopa-
mine functioning.
This is not to say that differences in performance between
suboptimal and optimal reward cues necessarily reflect a
difference in effort expenditure. As previous research has
pointed out (Gendolla et al. 2012), the relation between
effort and performance is not always a direct one. Strategic
processes on trials with optimal reward cues could either
change the relation between effort and performance, or
affect the process of effort expenditure by themselves. In
any case, because of the observed correlation between stri-
atal dopamine functioning and performance for suboptimal
reward cues, we assume that performance measures are a
better indicator of effort expenditure in the case of subop-
timal than optimal reward cues.
Although Pessiglione et al. (2007) ruled out strategic
responding as suboptimal reward cues could not be con-
sciously detected above chance level, the effect on
behavior under these conditions was found to be unrelated
to striatal activity. A possible reason for this may be that
the activity occurs in a quicker and more transient way
compared to optimal reward cues. Such an explanation is in
line with the idea that conscious awareness of a stimulus
keeps information carried by the stimulus active over a
sustained period of time (Dehaene and Naccache 2001). If
true, this accounts for why a direct link between subopti-
mal reward cues and striatal activation was not established,
as it may be the case that ventral striatum activation
occurred too quickly and too transiently to be detected with
fMRI. The current research is not hindered by these
methodological constraints as it relied on individual dif-
ferences in striatal dopaminergic functioning in relation to
overall task performance.
Although our results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions, the correlational nature of our findings may
allow for alternative accounts. Most notably, previous
studies have demonstrated relationships between activation
in the ventral striatum and individual differences in
learning performance (Santesso et al. 2008; Schonberg
et al. 2007; Vink et al. 2013), and learning effects might
explain performance in our task without having to assume
direct involvement of the dopamine system in producing
the effort response. That is, experimental tasks designed to
study the effects of optimal versus suboptimal reward cues
involve feedback about the obtained reward. This feed-
back, in turn, provides a clear opportunity for basic stim-
ulus–response learning. So, it could be argued that
learning takes place only on trials with optimal, con-
sciously processed reward cues. Effort responses to sub-
optimal reward cues, then, could just be learned,
a-motivational responses. The present pattern of findings,
however, seems incompatible with this account, as the
correlations between markers of dopaminergic functioning
and performance proved only to exist for suboptimal
rewards. So, if anything, it seems that the dopaminergic
system is involved in shaping performance especially on
these trials. Nevertheless, direct evidence for this
involvement is rather scarce (but see Pessiglione et al.
2008, 2011). More research is thus needed to delineate the
role of the subcortical reward center in the processing of
suboptimal reward cues.
The present research is in line with previous research
(Bijleveld et al. 2012b), suggesting that people are able to
pursue rewards that are perceived without awareness, and
that reward pursuit in this case is guided by a subcortical
reward system that is different from the one that dominates
conscious reward pursuit. The fact that such a difference
was observed in our second study even though brief reward
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cues were not fully shielded from conscious detection
suggest that differences in conscious awareness may by
associated with the operation of these different types of
reward processing, but that conscious awareness itself is
perhaps not the crucial factor that distinguishes them.
The general observation that different mechanisms may
underlie the processing of optimal and suboptimal reward
cues has larger implications for many aspects of cognition
and behavior. The rudimentary reward system has been
shown to play a role in processes ranging from goal pursuit
(Custers and Aarts 2010), the experience of agency (Aarts
et al. 2009), and financial decision-making (Knutson and
Greer 2008), to the experience of intrinsic enjoyment
during task performance (Murayama et al. 2010). In addi-
tion, variations in dopaminergic activity have been linked
to various neurological and psychiatric disorders, including
Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia, depression, and drug
addiction (Salamone et al. 2005). Exploring the functional
processes affected by these conditions can help in under-
standing the scope of the dysfunction, and how far its
symptoms reach in day-to-day functioning. Taken together,
by distinguishing between two different mechanisms for
reward processing, the present approach to studying moti-
vated action may in the future prove fruitful for enhancing
our understanding of human behavior across a wide variety
of domains.
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